Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice by Barton, Benjamin H. & Bibas, Stephanos
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1-1-2012 
Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to 
Justice 
Benjamin H. Barton 
University of Tennessee-Knoxville 
Stephanos Bibas 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Courts Commons, Criminology Commons, Law and Society 
Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Barton, Benjamin H. and Bibas, Stephanos, "Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to 
Justice" (2012). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 377. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/377 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
Barton&BibasFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  2/22/2012 12:00 PM 
  
(967) 
ARTICLE 
TRIAGING APPOINTED-COUNSEL FUNDING 
AND PRO SE ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
BENJAMIN H. BARTON & STEPHANOS BIBAS† 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 968 
I. TOO MANY NEEDS, TOO FEW DOLLARS ........................................ 972 
A. Underfunding Criminal Counsel:  Subverting Gideon ............... 972 
1. Capital Cases ..................................................................... 972 
2. Other Felonies .................................................................. 974 
3. Misdemeanors ................................................................... 976 
B. The Civil Gideon Movement ............................................ 977 
C. Unacknowledged Tradeoffs and Competing Demands .................. 980 
II.  TURNER’S TURN TO REALITY ........................................................ 982 
A. Gradations of Complexity and Need ............................................. 982 
B. Concerns with Formality and Delay ........................................... 983 
C. Less Intrusive Alternatives....................................................... 984 
III. TWO-AND-A-HALF CHEERS FOR TURNER ........................................ 985 
A. The Wisdom of Not Recognizing a Procrustean Right .................. 985 
B. More Sustainable Pro Se Court Reform ...................................... 987 
C. The Implicit Role of Resource Constraints .................................. 990 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 994 
 
 
†
Benjamin Barton is the Director of Clinical Programs and Professor of Law at the 
University of Tennessee College of Law.  Stephanos Bibas is a Professor of Law and 
Criminology and Director of the Supreme Court Clinic at the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School.  Professor Bibas served as counsel of record for respondents, and Professor 
Barton filed an amicus curiae brief in support of respondents on the merits, in Turner 
v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).  Thanks to Darryl Brown and Erica Hashimoto for 
their comments on an earlier draft. 
Barton&BibasFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  2/22/2012 12:00 PM 
968 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 967 
INTRODUCTION 
If appointing some lawyers is good, then appointing more lawyers 
must be better.  At least that seems to be the logic of the civil Gideon 
movement, which favors appointing counsel in civil cases just as Gideon 
v. Wainwright required appointing counsel in criminal cases.  The im-
pulse is understandable:  both indigent and pro se litigants face many 
hurdles in civil courts, and the stakes can be quite high.1  But even 
though criminal defendants do enjoy the Gideon right to counsel, the 
quality and availability of indigent criminal defense remain hobbled by 
inadequate funding.  Gideon’s shortcomings in the criminal context 
should caution us against assuming that a new judicially created right 
will alleviate chronic shortages.   
Over the last century, Powell v. Alabama, Gideon, and related cases 
have steadily expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in crim-
inal prosecutions, from a right to retain one’s own counsel to a right 
to appointed counsel in any case resulting in actual imprisonment.2  
Counsel must also meet minimum standards of effectiveness.3  The 
services that must be provided have also grown to include expert assis-
tance such as psychiatric examinations in criminal cases raising mental 
health issues.4  Civil litigants have had much less success, as the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly rejected a constitutional right to counsel 
in a variety of civil proceedings.5  Rather than giving up hope, however, 
 
1 See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 18-19 
(2005) (identifying “a very serious shortage of civil legal assistance” and noting that 
fewer than one in five indigent defendants has access to civil legal assistance). 
2 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (holding that appointment of coun-
sel is necessary in a capital case “where the defendant is . . . incapable adequately of 
making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the 
like”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963) (extending Powell to noncap-
ital prosecutions); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1972) (extending Gideon 
to any offense that results in imprisonment).  But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-
74 (1979) (establishing an actual-imprisonment limitation on right to counsel). 
3 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting the standard for 
ineffective assistance of counsel as “deficient” performance that actually prejudices the 
defendant). 
4 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). 
5 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-33 (1981) (rejecting an 
automatic right to counsel in proceedings to terminate parental rights); Vitek v. Jones, 
445 U.S. 480, 497 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (deciding that qualified assis-
tance, but not an attorney, must be provided when a prisoner faces involuntary transfer 
to a mental hospital); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07, 610 n.18 (1979) (holding 
that an impartial assessment, but not an adversarial hearing with a lawyer, is required 
before committing a minor to a mental hospital); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583 
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scholars and activists have continued to advocate for broad civil Gideon 
rights.6  Most notably, the American Bar Association (ABA) endorses 
appointing counsel for all poor people in adversarial proceedings im-
plicating basic human needs, such as food, shelter, safety, health, or 
child custody.7  Historically, bar associations’ support for expanding 
Gideon has proven quite influential.8 
Last year, the Supreme Court reopened the civil right-to-counsel 
debate by agreeing to hear Turner v. Rogers, in which a pro se mother 
sued a pro se father for failing to pay child support.9  The issue was 
whether the father had an automatic right to appointed counsel be-
fore he could be conditionally confined for civil contempt.10  Many 
activists hoped that the Court would overturn or narrow its earlier 
precedents and recognize a categorical right to counsel, at least in civil 
 
(1975) (finding that students have no constitutional right to retain counsel in school 
disciplinary proceedings); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1974) (declining 
to require retained or appointed counsel in prison disciplinary proceedings); see also 
Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320-26 (1985) (upholding 
a fee limitation on attorney compensation for veterans’ benefits proceedings). 
6 For example, since 2006 there have been at least three civil Gideon law review 
symposium issues.  See Symposium, An Obvious Truth:  Creating an Action Blueprint for a 
Civil Right to Counsel in New York State, 25 TOURO L. REV. 1 (2009); Symposium, A Right 
to Counsel in Civil Cases:  Civil Gideon in Maryland & Beyond, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 1 
(2007–2008); Edward V. Sparer Symposium:  Civil Gideon:  Creating a Constitutional Right to 
Counsel in the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 501 (2006); see also CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV., July–Aug. 2006 (dedicating an entire issue to civil Gideon laws); Robert 
W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 503, 505-
06 (1998) (arguing for an expanded due process right to representation). 
7 See STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS ET AL., AM. BAR 
ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 105 (REVISED) 1 (2010), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_ 
indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_105_revised_final_aug_2010.pdf.  State bar associations 
have also chimed in.  See, e.g., Thomas M. Burke, A Civil Gideon?  Let the Debate Begin, 65 
J. MO. B. 5, 5 (2009) (advocating appointing counsel in civil proceedings where “basic 
human needs are at stake”); Diane S. Diel, Speaking for the Justice System, WIS. LAW., Dec. 
2008, at 5, 5 (describing an inquiry by bar association presidents to then–President-
Elect Barack Obama as to his intentions to establish a federal civil Gideon); Scott Rus-
sell, Minnesota’s Legal Safety Net:  Many Hands Intertwined, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Mar. 
2009, at 22, 25 (2009) (discussing civil Gideon as the latest advocacy response to the 
shortage of resources for indigent litigants); State Bar Signs on to Letter to Obama, McCain, 
MONT. LAW., Nov. 2008, at 11, 11 (encouraging presidential candidates to embrace an 
expanded right to counsel). 
8 For example, the Supreme Court included a long, supportive quotation from 
the ABA in extending Gideon to misdemeanor cases in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 
25, 39 (1972). 
9 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2512 (2011). 
10 Id. 
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cases that result in a deprivation of liberty.11  Instead, all nine Justices 
rejected the claimed right to counsel, though a five-Justice majority 
required courts to help pro se litigants navigate the process them-
selves.12  In child support proceedings, the majority noted, courts may 
provide this assistance by (1) giving notice that ability to pay is a key 
issue; (2) asking defendants to fill out financial disclosure forms; (3) 
allowing defendants to respond to questions about their finances; and 
(4) making express findings regarding defendants’ ability to pay.13 
Turner dealt the death blow to hopes for a federally imposed civil 
Gideon.  Thirty years ago, the Lassiter court rejected a civil Gideon right 
in termination-of-parental-rights cases by a 5-4 vote over a vehement 
dissent.14  By 2011, the civil Gideon argument could not garner a single 
vote.  That was true even though the defendant in Turner faced one 
year in jail and Lassiter in dictum had presumed a right to appointed 
counsel when physical liberty is at stake.15  Given the importance of 
the liberty interest in Turner, the Court’s decision leaves little room 
for advocates to insist that a lesser liberty interest qualifies for Gide-
on’s protections. 
Though Turner upset many civil Gideon proponents,16 we should 
not lament the decision but instead (mostly) praise it.  In rejecting a 
broad new constitutional right, the Court steered toward more sus-
tainable reform for pro se litigants.  The Court’s solution is far more 
realistic than a grandiose new right to counsel.  Indeed, funding for 
counsel is scarce, existing lawyers are already overtaxed, and appoint-
ing civil lawyers would siphon time and resources from felony cases, 
which are typically more important and more complex.  In a world of 
scarce resources, legislatures, courts, and legal aid organizations need 
flexibility in order to triage cases.  Both the Constitution and sensible 
policy thus favor reserving appointed counsel primarily for criminal 
 
11 For a partial list of the amicus briefs filed in Turner v. Rogers in support of a civil 
Gideon right, see infra note 76.  
12 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512.   
13 Id. at 2519.   
14 See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 35 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he Court avoids what seems to me the obvious conclusion that due process 
requires the presence of counsel for a parent threatened with judicial termination of 
parental rights, and, instead, revives an ad hoc approach thoroughly discredited nearly 
20 years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright.”). 
15 Id. at 26-27, quoted in Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516. 
16 For example, the legal blog Concurring Opinions hosted a post-Turner symposi-
um that largely condemned the civil Gideon portion of the case.  See Archive for the 
Turner Symposium, CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/category/symposium-turner-v-rogers (last visited Jan. 15, 2012). 
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cases.  Appointment of counsel in civil cases must be selective and dis-
cretionary, used only for the most complex and most meritorious cases.  
While giving everyone a lawyer is an impossible dream, less expensive 
pro se court reform is far more feasible.  Turner did not explicitly dis-
cuss the importance of resource constraints, but its holding makes 
much more sense given the reality of limited funds. 
Properly handled, pro se court processes can be cheaper and fairer.  
Extraordinarily, the Court noted that appointing counsel in pro se civil 
cases could make the proceedings “less fair overall” and introduce un-
warranted “formality or delay.”17  Though that observation is a matter of 
common sense, the Court’s prior case law had consistently praised law-
yers’ role in guaranteeing just procedures.18  Turner’s changed tune re-
flects a more mature, more nuanced view of lawyers and the complexity 
inherent in the adversarial system.  If Turner helps to spur new pro se 
court processes that are simpler and fairer, everyone will benefit. 
Part I of this Article surveys the state of the scholarly literature and 
case law before Turner.  Academics had long complained about chron-
ic underfunding of indigent criminal defense while calling for more 
money across the board.  Civil Gideon reformers had likewise called for 
funding civil counsel programs.  But there was little sense that these 
goals entailed tradeoffs and little emphasis on pro se court reform as a 
viable, less costly alternative.  The same activists sometimes endorsed 
both of these goals, which are at least in tension with each other, if not 
outright contradictory. 
Part II analyzes Turner.  The Court recognized that not all cases are 
alike:  even where the stakes are high, some cases are not complex 
enough to require a lawyer.  It also worried that appointing counsel 
would add formality and delay, harming innocent parties on the other 
side of civil proceedings.  Further, the Court introduced a new focus on 
the availability of less intrusive alternatives, notably pro se assistance. 
Part III gives two-and-a-half cheers for Turner’s shift.  The Court 
wisely avoided creating a Procrustean civil Gideon rule and carefully 
separated civil from criminal cases.  It steered future developments 
toward more sustainable pro se court reform.  And though the Court 
 
17 131 S. Ct. at 2519.  
18 Starting with Powell v. Alabama and continuing through to Gideon and Argersinger, 
the Supreme Court has treated the availability of a lawyer as an unqualified good and a 
necessary ingredient of fair judicial procedures.  For a discussion of some of this case 
law, see BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
54-60 (2011). 
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did not discuss funding limitations, its approach is consistent with the 
need to triage cases.  Criminal cases are more important and more 
complex, and there is less of a role for lawyers in many civil cases.  
We cannot and will not provide lawyers to everyone.  Turner rightly 
rejected that impossible dream.  It is far more important to fund ap-
pointed lawyers in serious felony cases than it is to provide them in, 
say, housing court.  This Article concludes that the task ahead is to 
make civil lawsuits simpler and more accessible to nonlawyers. 
I.  TOO MANY NEEDS, TOO FEW DOLLARS 
In the decades preceding Turner, scholars and advocates chal-
lenged the dearth of appointed counsel and resources on a variety of 
fronts.  Capital defendants, they noted, suffer from woefully inade-
quate funding for lawyers and support services.  Other felony and mis-
demeanor defendants likewise have overworked, underfunded lawyers 
who quickly press them to plead guilty.  The result is an epidemic of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  In civil cases, resources are still scarc-
er.  There are few appointed lawyers even in cases with significant 
stakes, such as divorce, child custody, child support, housing, and im-
migration proceedings. 
Yet these advocates rarely acknowledged the tension between their 
competing goals in the criminal and civil contexts.  Funding to ap-
point counsel is limited, and guaranteeing lawyers in more cases will 
spread existing resources too thin.  As it is, criminal defense lawyers 
risk being ineffective because they have too little time and too few 
support services.  A broad civil Gideon right would thus effectively un-
dercut Gideon itself. 
A.  Underfunding Criminal Counsel:  Subverting Gideon 
1.  Capital Cases 
For almost eighty years, the Supreme Court has recognized a right 
to appointed counsel in capital cases.19  Yet, to this day, indigent capi-
tal defense remains scandalously underfunded.  To guarantee effective 
counsel, states must offer enough money to attract and retain quali-
fied, experienced lawyers and to give them the investigative, forensic, 
and administrative support they need.  But funding indigent defense, 
especially capital defense, is hardly a political priority, so attorney 
 
19 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). 
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compensation is paltry.  Capital defenders may be paid flat fees or 
hourly rates subject to low statutory caps, which may work out to twelve 
dollars per hour or less.20   
Nor is there enough funding for support services.  Effective capital 
defense requires thorough research into the facts surrounding the 
crime as well as the defendant’s background, family, upbringing, men-
tal health, and character.  This research necessitates private investiga-
tors, paralegals, secretaries, and quite possibly forensic experts, 
psychiatrists, doctors, and social workers.  But the compensation de-
scribed above hardly covers the basic overhead costs for secretaries or 
paralegals.  And many capital defenders must perform their jobs with-
out any investigative or expert assistance at all.  Courts sometimes deny 
funding by requiring strong showings to justify expenses, or they award 
only several hundred dollars to cover an entire trial.21  Poor funding 
thus undercuts the right to expert assistance.22  As a result, few experi-
enced lawyers are willing to take capital cases, and those who do lack 
the time and tools to do a thorough job. 
The problem is especially acute because capital cases are among 
the longest and most complex proceedings in our legal system, and 
capital defendants have the most at stake.  Moreover, capital defense 
attorneys are often outgunned by prosecutors who enjoy better pay 
and investigative and expert support as well as more experience and 
specialization in capital punishment.23  In some states, certain prosecu-
 
20 See, e.g., Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1992) (over-
turning death sentence on federal habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel where counsel was paid $11.84 per hour and “the justice system got only what it 
paid for”); Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor:  The Death Sentence Not for the Worst 
Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1838, 1853, 1868 (1993) (collecting 
examples of inadequate compensation for indigent defense, with some rates as low as 
$4.05 per hour); Adam M. Gershowitz, Statewide Capital Punishment:  The Case for Elimi-
nating Counties’ Role in the Death Penalty, 63 VAND. L. REV. 307, 323-26 (2010) (describing 
egregious examples of inadequate, incompetent, and underpaid indigent defense). 
21 See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science:  The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement 
Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 53, 76-77 & n.158 (noting underfunding 
of expert assistance for indigent defendants and arguing that “the asymmetry in re-
sources is pronounced”). 
22 See Cara H. Drinan, The Revitalization of Ake:  A Capital Defendant’s Right to Expert 
Assistance, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 288-96 (2007) (describing a variety of statutory and 
judicial hurdles that contribute to a pervasive lack of expert assistance in capital cases). 
23 See Bright, supra note 20, at 1844-48 (“In contrast to the prosecution’s virtually 
unlimited access to experts and investigative assistance, the lawyer defending the indi-
gent accused in a capital case may not have any investigative or expert assistance to 
prepare for trial and present a defense.”). 
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tors specialize in capital prosecutions, while there is no comparable 
public defender unit.  Instead, defense lawyers are appointed ad hoc 
and cannot develop repeat-player expertise.24 
Two recent Georgia cases are particularly galling.  In Phan v. State 
and Weis v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court forced death penalty tri-
als to proceed even though Georgia had stopped paying the defend-
ants’ lawyers when the State’s indigent defense fund went bankrupt.25 
The result is a playing field tilted toward death.  Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, despite the guarantee in the Sixth Amendment, is 
rampant.  The American Bar Association has lamented that “grossly 
unqualified and under compensated lawyers who have nothing like 
the support necessary to mount an adequate defense are often ap-
pointed to represent capital clients.  In case after case, decisions about 
who will die and who will live turn . . . on the nature of the legal repre-
sentation the defendant receives.”26  Poor training, preparation, and 
compensation infect many capital trials.27  Significant funding increases 
are needed to train and retain competent capital defense lawyers and 
to give them the tools to do their job effectively. 
2.  Other Felonies 
The capital defense system has received much attention—and some 
additional funding—over the past twenty years.28  The rampant under-
funding of noncapital defense, however, has largely flown under the 
radar.  Felony defenders are frequently paid much less than the prose-
cutors they oppose.29  Compensation can run as low as $40 per hour, 
 
24 See Stephen B. Bright, Legal Representation for the Poor:  Can Society Afford This Much 
Injustice?, 75 MO. L. REV. 683, 690 (2010) (explaining the ad hoc system of judicially 
appointing capital defense attorneys and the resulting perverse incentives for lawyers 
who depend on judges for their income). 
25 Phan v. State, 699 S.E.2d 9, 10-11 (Ga. 2010); Weis v. State, 694 S.E.2d 350, 353-
58 (Ga. 2010).  For a gripping overview of the logical and legal gymnastics in these 
opinions, see Bright, supra note 24, at 691-97. 
26 LESLIE A. HARRIS, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (1997), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/ 
downloads/sclaid/20110325_aba_107.authcheckdam.pdf. 
27 See Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama’s Capital Defense Prob-
lems:  It’s a Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26-32 (1992) (describing these 
pervasive inadequacies in Alabama). 
28 For example, the Justice for All Act of 2004 offers federal funding to improve state 
capital defense.  Justice for All Act of 2004 §§ 421–422, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14163–14163a (2006). 
29 See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public 
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 230 (2004) (“By and large, entry-level prosecutors 
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and per-case caps can be as low as $600 per case for less serious felonies 
and $1235 per case for more serious felonies.30  Further, indigent de-
fense lawyers carry heavy caseloads, often juggling hundreds of cases at 
once.31  As one judge described managing 418 defendants over seven 
months in New Orleans, “Not even a lawyer with an S on his chest could 
effectively handle this docket.”32  Defenders, unlike prosecutors, typically 
have little or no investigative or expert support.33  A survey of nearly two 
thousand felony cases in Alabama showed that “no motions were filed 
for funds for experts or investigators in 99.4% of the cases.”34 
Felony defenders also have little time to meet with their clients, 
particularly when a face-to-face meeting would require a long trip to a 
distant jail.  Their only communication with each client may be no 
more than a hurried conversation in a courtroom hallway or holding 
cell in the few minutes before a court appearance.  To manage their 
crushing workloads, defense lawyers very often “meet ‘em and plead 
‘em,” pressing their clients to plead guilty immediately before doing 
any investigation.35  Naturally, defendants mistrust lawyers whose only 
interest appears to be getting rid of their case.36 
Because funds are tight, many counties contract these services 
out to the lowest bidder for a flat fee.37  Lawyers who accept these 
contracts can continue to earn more money by handling private cas-
es, and there is no financial incentive to attract good lawyers or pro-
vide zealous representation.  Instead, the system encourages lawyers 
 
earn higher salaries than entry-level public defenders.  The salary differences persist at 
every level of experience . . . .”). 
30 Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 MO. L. REV. 907, 912-13 
(2010); see also STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, GIDEON’ S BROKEN PROMISE:  AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 
9-10 (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE] (cataloguing reported instances 
of inadequate attorney compensation in various jurisdictions). 
31 See Bright, supra note 20, at 1850-51; Wright, supra note 29, at 231. 
32 State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993) (quoting trial judge). 
33 Wright, supra note 29, at 231. 
34 GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 30, at 19. 
35 See id. at 16 (describing the typical practice in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, as relat-
ed by several witnesses who experienced the parish’s “meet ‘em and plead ‘em” lawyers). 
36 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless:  The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1449, 1462-63 (2005) (noting the mistrust of public defenders and explaining 
that it exacerbates this “not uncommon . . . ‘meet ‘em and plead ‘em’ scenario”). 
37 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, LOW-BID CRIMINAL DEFENSE 
CONTRACTING:  JUSTICE IN RETREAT 1 (1997). 
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to scrimp on support services, as any overhead or expert costs come 
directly out of their own pay.38 
Numerous public interest organizations decry this state of affairs 
and rightly call for reform.  As the American Bar Association put it, 
“Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United 
States remains in a state of crisis” in part because “[f]unding for indi-
gent defense services is shamefully inadequate.”39  The Constitution 
Project emphatically agrees,40 as does the National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers.41  
In short, underfunded indigent defense systems offer chronically 
ineffective representation.  Defender organizations and public interest 
groups have tried to solve the problem by filing lawsuits challenging 
this state of affairs and seeking better funding.  These lawsuits, how-
ever, have failed to result in meaningful change.42 
3.  Misdemeanors 
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court extended the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel to misdemeanor charges that can result 
in actual imprisonment.43  Thus, the right extends not only to hun-
dreds of thousands of felony cases per year, but also to millions of 
misdemeanors as well.44  Alabama v. Shelton further expanded that right 
 
38 See id. at 2 (“Fixed-price contracts, requiring representation of all cases, inevita-
bly result in case overload and inadequate representation with built-in incentives to 
process cases quickly and disincentives to take cases all the way to trial.  Such systems 
discourage the use of investigators, forensic specialists, [and] expert witnesses . . . .”). 
39 GIDEON ’ S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 30, at v. 
40 NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED:  
AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 7 
(2009) (noting that inadequate funding leads to “astonishingly large caseloads” and 
“second-rate legal services”). 
41 See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 37, at 1 (complaining that 
“maximum caseload standards are routinely ignored, needed experts are underutilized 
and prolonged appellate delays are commonplace” (footnotes omitted)). 
42 See Note, Effectively Ineffective:  The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1741 (2005) (noting that even three widely cele-
brated litigation success stories reflect “judicial reluctance to undertake sustainable 
systemic indigent defense reform”).  But cf. Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indi-
gent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 462-63 (2009) (acknowl-
edging the mixed record of success of these suits but expressing optimism about future 
strategies focusing on indigent defense litigation in federal court). 
43 407 U.S. 25, 37-40 (1972). 
44 See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 461, 477 (2007) (reporting estimates that, since 1972, 690,000 felony cases and up 
to 2.7 million misdemeanor cases per year required appointed counsel). 
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to cases resulting in probation that could eventually be enforced by 
imprisonment.45  Thus, a fair number of misdemeanor defendants re-
ceive appointed counsel; in federal court, for example, one-quarter 
did between 2000 and 2005.46  Often, however, counsel is not immedi-
ately available and defendants must wait before receiving lawyers, 
sometimes for months, even if they are jailed pending trial.47 
Even when lawyers are appointed, they often must juggle hundreds 
of misdemeanors and have little time to spend on each one.  Particu-
larly in the most minor cases, defense lawyers do little more than ask 
for, and often receive, lenient dispositions such as suspended sentenc-
es.48  Because of resource constraints, they hardly have the time or in-
centive to do anything else.  Prosecutors and judges, for their part, 
discourage filing motions and routinely treat minor cases as eligible 
for nonprison sentences.49  Josh Bowers, a former Bronx public de-
fender, has reported that prosecutors and defenders alike view some 
low-level cases, such as public-order cases, as “disposables” that merit 
cookie-cutter dispositions.50  This is a natural response to the crushing 
number of misdemeanor cases on top of felonies:  every actor in the 
criminal justice system simply hurries cases along the plea-bargaining 
assembly line. 
B.  The Civil Gideon Movement 
Many parties to important civil disputes cannot afford counsel.  
Tenants facing eviction, immigrants facing deportation, parents facing 
 
45 535 U.S. 654, 658, 674 (2002). 
46 Hashimoto, supra note 44, at 489-90. 
47 See Michael Pearson, Judge:  Fulton Must Cut Jail Load, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 17, 
2002, at 1B, available at 2002 WLNR 4649292 (reporting that “lengthy delays in pro-
cessing suspects accused of minor crimes is one of the main reasons the county jail is 
overcrowded” and that “[s]ome [inmates] now go months before they are even ar-
raigned” and receive lawyers).  In Mississippi in 2003, a man charged with resisting 
arrest spent two-and-a-half months in the county jail before he saw a lawyer.  Adam 
Liptak, County Says It’s Too Poor to Defend the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at A1.  The 
maximum punishment for resisting arrest in Mississippi is six months in jail and a five-
hundred dollar fine.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-73 (West 2005). 
48 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING:  THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 70, 72, 81 (1978). 
49 See id. at 61-66, 103-06. 
50 Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prose-
cute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1709 (2010).  This concern is not new.  In Argersinger, 
the Court warned of the dangers of “assembly-line justice” and plea mills for misde-
meanor defendants.  See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34-36 (1972). 
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termination of parental rights, and employees facing loss of their jobs 
have no automatic right to appointed counsel.  This is true even when 
their opponent (be it the state, a landlord, or an employer) is repre-
sented by counsel.  The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) has estimat-
ed that less than one-fifth of low-income people’s legal needs are 
being met.51  As a result, often legal services offices can offer only brief 
advice, placement on a long waiting list for help, or nothing at all.52  
Even the current low level of LSC funding is in danger of being cut 
much further.53 
To many, an appointed lawyer seems essential to balance the scales 
and protect the poor and powerless.  That understanding seems to 
comport with Gideon itself, which recognized that “lawyers in criminal 
courts are necessities, not luxuries.”54  
Calls for a parallel Gideon right in civil cases followed almost im-
mediately on the heels of Gideon.  As early as 1965, an indigent litigant 
argued (unsuccessfully) that Gideon and the Due Process Clause re-
quired appointing counsel in a property dispute.55  Likewise, a 1967 
Yale Law Journal Note argued that “if an affluent [civil] litigant cannot 
get a fair trial without a lawyer, an indigent litigant cannot either.”56  
Other commentators soon followed.57 
 
51 LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 3 (updated 
ed. 2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_ 
the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf. 
52 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 13-14 (2004). 
53 The House Appropriations Committee proposed a $104 million funding cut for 
the LSC for Fiscal Year 2012, a 26% reduction in funding from 2011.  See Press Release, 
Legal Servs. Corp., House Proposal Would Cut Civil Legal Aid by $104 Million (July 6, 
2011), available at http://www.lsc.gov/media/press-releases/house-proposal-would-cut-
civil-legal-aid-104-million. 
54 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
55 Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), cert. denied, 
385 U.S. 901 (1966). 
56 Note, The Indigent’s Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 549 (1967).  
57 See, e.g., Francis William O’Brien, Why Not Appointed Counsel in Civil Cases?  The 
Swiss Approach, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 13 (1967) (querying why Americans’ constitutional 
sensibilities “dull when innocent people are made to suffer by unjust decisions in civil 
cases”); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 554, 556 (1976) (arguing that “logic indicates that civil property 
rights should receive the same protection” as “life and liberty”); Note, The Indigent’s 
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 989, 997 (1975) (suggesting one 
“instance where constitutional rights may be violated by the failure to appoint counsel 
in civil litigation”); Note, The Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 
1331 (1966) (“[T]he inability of the unskilled litigant . . . seems no less debilitating in 
most civil litigation.”).  
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Gideon was followed by two Court cases that seemed to support a 
civil extension of Gideon.  First, In re Gault extended Gideon to juvenile 
proceedings that might result in confinement, even though juvenile 
proceedings are not technically criminal.58  Gault reasoned that due 
process guaranteed appointed counsel because the juvenile’s liberty 
was at stake; the Court did not rely upon the Sixth Amendment at all.59  
Thus, where the liberty interest is important enough, the due process 
right to appointed counsel can extend beyond Sixth Amendment 
criminal cases.   
Five years later, Argersinger v. Hamlin extended the Sixth Amend-
ment right to appointed counsel beyond felonies to any misdemeanor 
prosecution that resulted in jail time, however short.60  That set a low 
bar for liberty interests, as many civil cases involve more serious depri-
vations than a day in jail:  consider deportation, termination of paren-
tal rights, or a year in jail for civil contempt.  Taken together, Gault 
and Argersinger seemed to support a civil Gideon right.  Nevertheless, no 
lower court announced a broad constitutional guarantee of appointed 
counsel in a civil case between Gideon and Lassiter, and the Supreme 
Court cases between Argersinger and Lassiter were a mixed bag.61  
Lassiter itself dealt a crippling blow to civil Gideon hopes.  It ad-
dressed a particularly serious liberty interest—termination of parental 
rights.62  The Court presumed that “there is a right to appointed coun-
sel only where the indigent . . . may lose his personal freedom.”63  In 
the absence of actual incarceration, this presumption weighs “against” 
appointment of counsel.64  Lassiter also addressed a case brought by a 
government lawyer in an area of law that can be quite complex.65  Nev-
ertheless, the Court recognized no right to counsel. 
 
58 See 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967). 
59 Id. at 36-42. 
60 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
61 See, e.g., In re Smiley, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56-57 (N.Y. 1975) (holding that indigent 
wives in divorce proceedings have no right to publicly compensated counsel and that 
the issue is more appropriate for legislative resolution).  For a helpful overview of the 
pre-Lassiter cases and the difficulty in squaring them, see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507, 2516-17 (2011). 
62 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1981). 
63 Id. at 27. 
64 Id. 
65 See id. at 30 (“[T]he ultimate issues with which a termination hearing deals are 
not always simple . . . .”).  
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Following Lassiter, civil Gideon hopes lay fallow for many years.66  
One sign of a rekindling of interest was U.S. District Judge Robert 
Sweet’s 1997 speech at Yale Law School advocating for appointed 
counsel in civil matters.67  The speech was published in the Yale Law 
and Policy Review and may have helped to renew interest in civil Gideon 
rights.68  Some of these new supporters advocate civil Gideon rights in a 
specific area of civil law; others attack Lassiter head-on; and still others 
read U.S. treaty obligations as requiring appointed civil counsel.69   
C.  Unacknowledged Tradeoffs and Competing Demands 
Many proponents of a civil Gideon right fail to recognize three 
fundamental truths:  First, though Gideon has improved the quality of 
felony defense somewhat, it has hardly been a ringing success, primari-
ly because funds are inadequate and courts are loath to overturn con-
victions based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Second, a judicially 
created civil Gideon right would be even less protected than indigent 
criminal defense.  Third, a civil Gideon right would likely undermine 
indigent criminal defense by stretching limited resources further.  
Even if the money did not come directly from criminal defense fund-
ing, other areas of state budgets would feel the strain.  Supporters of 
recognizing a civil Gideon and of providing adequate funding for indi-
gent criminal defense see themselves as fighting the same battle for 
justice, without acknowledging the inevitable tradeoffs between the 
two goals.70   
 
66 See HOWARD H. DANA, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, 
RESOLUTION 112A, at 10, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_06A112A.pdf (“For over 
two decades, the Lassiter decision appeared to paralyze serious consideration of a right 
to counsel in civil cases.”). 
67 Sweet, supra note 6, at 505-06. 
68 A Westlaw search in the JLR database for the term “civil Gideon” finds 217 arti-
cles, with only three mentions predating the publication of Sweet’s speech. 
69 See, e.g., Laura K. Abel, A Right to Counsel in Civil Cases:  Lessons from Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 527, 531-34 (2006) (asserting that Lassit-
er, like Betts v. Brady before it, should be overturned); Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-
Based Civil Gideon from the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
697, 712 (2006) (arguing that certain private custody cases “are strong starting points 
for civil Gideon strategies”); Sarah Paoletti, Deriving Support from International Law for the 
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 651, 654, 657, 659-60 
(2006) (arguing that treaties and international norms support a U.S. right to counsel in 
civil proceedings). 
70 For example, the ABA advocates both additional funding for indigent defense 
and civil Gideon.  See RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, AM. BAR ASS’N, THE IN-
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Policy activists find establishing new rights through constitutional 
adjudication appealing because it circumvents the political process.  
Courts usually do not consider explicitly whether the government can 
afford to behave constitutionally.  If the Constitution requires lawyers in 
civil court, the government will have to provide them regardless of cost. 
Gideon and its progeny, however, expose two fallacies in this 
strategy.  First, courts weigh issues of cost implicitly even if they do 
not make them explicit.71  Second, even if courts establish new rights, 
it is up to legislatures to fund them.  And if legislatures limit their sup-
port, the right will remain underfunded.  Darryl Brown has established 
that state funding for indigent defense is “epiphenomenal.”72  Using 
data from all fifty states, Brown showed that funding is determined not 
by the number of criminal prosecutions in each state, but rather by a 
complicated blend of political factors largely uncorrelated with the 
underlying need.73  In other words, political forces determine funding, 
especially because courts find it far easier to lay out broad rights than 
to force legislatures to fund them.74   
Thoughtful civil Gideon proponents have thus turned to legislative 
lobbying.  They have achieved some success in California, which in 
2009 passed legislation requiring counsel for some civil matters, in-
cluding child custody and foreclosure proceedings.75  Statutory civil 
Gideon rights may be problematic for other reasons, but at least they 
leave legislatures free to revise them if they prove unworkable or too 
expensive.  Legislative rationing can be overt and subject to voters’ 
consideration at the polls; by contrast, rationing of judicially created 
rights occurs through covert subversion and neglect.  
 
DIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 8 (1993) (reporting on severe under-funding of appointed 
criminal defense in the United States); infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
71 Argersinger, the case that expanded Gideon to misdemeanor prosecutions, did ex-
plicitly discuss the availability of lawyers to staff misdemeanor cases.  See 407 U.S. 25, 37 
n.7 (1972) (using nationwide statistics to counter the fear noted in Justice Powell’s con-
currence that there were insufficient attorneys to represent misdemeanor defendants).  
The majority did not address the cost of these additional lawyers, however.  See id. 
72 Brown, supra note 30, at 908. 
73 Id. at 915-20. 
74 For an excellent overview of the generally unsuccessful attempts to win greater 
Gideon funding through lawsuits, see Note, supra note 42, at 1736-41. 
75 Act of Oct. 11, 2009, 2009 Cal. Stat. 2498 (codified in scattered sections of CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE and CAL. GOV’T CODE); see also Tamara Audi, ‘Civil Gideon’ Trum-
pets Legal Discord, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2009, at A3 (describing the funding for the 
California law). 
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II.  TURNER’S TURN TO REALITY 
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear Turner spurred renewed op-
timism among civil Gideon proponents.  Many public interest law 
groups filed amicus briefs supporting the petitioner, arguing that a 
right to counsel was essential to prevent injustice.76  The Court disap-
pointed them, unanimously rejecting the claimed categorical right.  
The majority advanced three basic reasons for not recognizing a civil 
right to counsel.  First, it recognized that different cases have differing 
levels of complexity and differing needs for lawyers.  Second, it wor-
ried about the excessive formality and delay that lawyers often intro-
duce into civil proceedings.  Finally, it recognized the availability of 
less intrusive alternatives, most notably pro se legal assistance.  This 
Part addresses each reason in turn. 
A.  Gradations of Complexity and Need 
Turner’s argument for a civil right to counsel leaned heavily on his 
interest in avoiding an erroneous deprivation of liberty.  The Court 
acknowledged that his interest in physical liberty was significant and 
did require due process protection.77  But that interest, although sig-
nificant, was not dispositive. 
 The Court rightly gave substantial weight to the simplicity of the 
issue in dispute.  Lawyers may be essential to parse complex statutes 
and technical regulations.  But the heart of most child support en-
forcement actions concerns the basic question of whether the noncus-
todial parent has the ability to pay.  At least when courts follow proper 
procedures, determining ability to pay is usually a commonsense mat-
ter of articulating income, expenses, and assets.  Anyone can tell a 
judge where he works, how much he earns per week, and how much 
he spends on rent and medical bills. 
 
76 See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae American Bar Association in Support of Petition-
er at 8, Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (No. 10-10); Brief of Center for Family 
Policy & Practice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Peti-
tioner at 9-12, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of the Legal Aid Society of the 
District of Columbia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 8, Turner, 131 S. 
Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers et al. in Support of Petitioner at 5, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); 
Brief of Elizabeth G. Patterson et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10, 
Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10). 
77 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2518. 
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Similarly, every day, unrepresented criminal defendants must 
prove that they are indigent before they can qualify for court-appointed 
counsel.78  Indigence is a simple factual prerequisite to counsel, not an 
issue that itself requires counsel.  The Court left open whether there 
might be a right to counsel in the occasional exceptionally complex 
case, as Turner made no such claim.79  But while lawyers might be 
marginally helpful in routine cases, they are not essential to satisfy 
due process. 
B.  Concerns with Formality and Delay 
Nor did the Court subscribe to the faith that lawyers always im-
prove proceedings.  Decades earlier, it had noted Judge Friendly’s wise 
caution about lawyers’ cost:  “Within the limits of professional proprie-
ty, causing delay and sowing confusion not only are [the lawyer’s] 
right but may be his duty.”80  The Court embraced that point in Turner, 
noting that lawyers can change the nature of proceedings by making 
them slower and more complex.81  One must consider not only the 
noncustodial parent but also the custodial parent, who is often forced 
to pursue her claim pro se precisely because she is impoverished by 
the nonpayment of child support.  Providing a lawyer for only one par-
ent would tilt the scales, perhaps making proceedings less fair overall.82  
In other words, the Court balanced tradeoffs and downsides instead of 
assuming that more lawyers and more process are always better. 
The history of criminal procedure confirms the Court’s rational 
observation that lawyers make proceedings slower and more technical.  
As John Langbein has argued, the advent of legal representation great-
ly increased the length and complexity of criminal proceedings.83  By 
 
78 See, e.g., id. at 2518-19. 
79 Id. at 2520. 
80 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325 (1985) (quoting 
Henry J. Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1975)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787-88 (1973) 
(explaining that the addition of defense attorneys in revocation proceedings could 
sacrifice the system’s “informality, flexibility, and economy”). 
81 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519-20. 
82 See id. at 2519 (cautioning that providing counsel to only one parent could create 
an “asymmetry of representation” that would undermine the fairness of the proceeding). 
83 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 16-17 (2003) 
(noting that before the advent of the adversarial system, trials took fifteen to thirty 
minutes); see also John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 
13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 262-65 (1979) (describing how summary jury trials in the 
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the time Gideon was decided, technical rules of evidence, pleading, and 
procedure had grown too complex for laymen to grasp.  Now, “lawyers 
in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries,” because only they have 
“skill in the science of law.”84  This requirement may well have been 
necessary for criminal defendants, given both the Sixth Amendment 
and the high stakes in criminal cases.  But the Court was wise to pause 
before likewise mandating lawyers in civil cases.  That is doubly true, as 
Section III.C will argue, because of the tension between funding crim-
inal and civil counsel. 
Formality and delay may be worth the cost when the stakes are 
high and the issues are sufficiently complex.  Accordingly, the Court 
left the door open to providing lawyers when both of those factors are 
present.  But only a small fraction of child support cases are complex, 
and due process rules should be crafted for run-of-the-mill cases, not 
exceptional ones.85  Stronger remedies can be reserved for those ex-
ceptions. 
C.  Less Intrusive Alternatives 
The final pillar of the Court’s reasoning was that alternative 
measures could satisfy due process.  The parties had briefed and argued 
the case all along as solely a right-to-counsel case, and the merits ques-
tion presented was limited to that issue.86  Other alternatives were never 
considered nor developed below, so there was no record on the range 
of alternatives and their efficacy.  Justice Thomas’s dissent thus criticized 
the majority for reaching an issue raised for the first time on the merits 
in an amicus brief.87  Nevertheless, the majority gave significant weight 
to the Solicitor General’s suggested alternative procedures.88  Those in-
cluded (1) notifying defendants that ability to pay will be a critical issue; 
(2) using financial disclosure forms; (3) allowing defendants to respond 
 
eighteenth century processed many more cases than modern courts without the con-
straints of procedure or presence of counsel). 
84 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
85 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976) (emphasizing that rules 
should be “shaped by . . . the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions”). 
86 See Brief for Petitioner at i, 27-51, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10); Brief of 
Respondents at 65, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) (noting that “petitioner’s 
merits brief explicitly asks for ‘a categorical right to counsel, not merely a case-by-case 
right that depends on the merit or complexity of the case’” (quoting Brief for Peti-
tioner, supra, at 50 n.24)). 
87 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2524-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. at 2519-20 (majority opinion). 
Barton&BibasFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  2/22/2012 12:00 PM 
2012] Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice 985 
 
to follow-up questions about their finances at hearings; and (4) making 
express findings related to defendants’ abilities to pay.89 
The Court put particular stock in this suggestion because of the 
federal government’s expertise in child support enforcement.90  It also 
noted that while these procedures would be constitutionally sufficient, 
there might be other alternatives, such as supplying social workers, 
that could also satisfy due process.91  Thus, rather than freezing the law 
in place, Turner’s holding at least acknowledged the possibility of 
achieving the same goal through different means. 
These remedies, the Court noted, not only suffice but also avoid 
some of the drawbacks of a broad right to counsel.  In particular, they 
avoid the complexity and delay that could make it harder for pro se 
custodial parents to collect the support they are owed.92  In short, the 
Court’s reasoning was at least somewhat sensitive to the policy 
tradeoffs of mandating appointed counsel across the board.   
III.  TWO-AND-A-HALF CHEERS FOR TURNER 
Turner got it right.  First, by refusing to constitutionalize a new civil 
Gideon right, the Court avoided imposing a one-size-fits-all rule on a 
variety of states and lawsuits.  Second, by endorsing much less intrusive 
alternatives, the Court steered future developments toward more sus-
tainable pro se court reform.  And third, by taking into account the 
complexity of the issue and the interests of pro se custodial parents, 
the Court accommodated resource constraints and tradeoffs.  While 
the Court could have been more explicit about the need to triage lim-
ited resources, its ruling reinforces a sound policy of husbanding 
scarce funds instead of spreading them too thin. 
A.  The Wisdom of Not Recognizing a Procrustean Right 
First, neither Turner nor Lassiter held that counsel may never be 
appointed in particularly complicated or contested civil cases.  To 
the contrary, both cases asked whether the Due Process Clause auto-
matically requires appointed counsel in every termination of parental 
 
89 Id. at 2519. 
90 Cf. id. at 2517 (noting that the “Federal Government has created an elaborate 
procedural mechanism designed to help both the government and custodial parents to 
secure the payments to which they are entitled”). 
91 Id. at 2519. 
92 Id. at 2519-20. 
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rights or civil contempt/child support case.93  An indigent litigant can 
still request appointed counsel, and the judge must weigh, case by 
case, whether fundamental fairness requires appointing a lawyer.94  
Thus, the question is not whether allowing some defendants to go un-
represented in civil contempt cases is sometimes fundamentally unfair, 
but whether it is always or very often unfair.  For child support pro-
ceedings, the answer is no:  the opposing party is often unrepresented 
and the issue is simple, so lawyers are not essential across the board. 
Second, the Court finally acknowledged that lawyers can sometimes 
make proceedings less fair.  The Court’s Sixth Amendment cases have 
regularly praised counsel as indispensable for procedural fairness.  In 
Powell, the Court waxed eloquent about how “[t]he right to be heard” 
would be hollow without “the guiding hand of counsel” “skill[ed] in the 
science of law.”95  Gideon likewise recognized the “obvious truth” that 
lawyers uphold the “noble ideal” of “fair trials before impartial tribu-
nals.”96  And, in Miranda, where the Court sought to protect the right to 
remain silent, it mandated warning suspects that they have the right to 
an attorney.97  In so doing, the Court praised counsel’s “vital role” in 
protecting the accused while promoting the administration of justice.98 
The Court has long equated more lawyers with more justice—but 
that faith is finally waning.  In other recent cases, the Court has rejected 
attorneys’ claims that the lawyer-client relationship or the duty of zeal-
ous advocacy requires special or broader protections.99  Turner’s turn 
 
93 Id. at 2520; see also Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) 
(“[N]either can we say the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every 
parental termination proceeding.”). 
94 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-34. 
95 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). 
96 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).  The Court followed this lan-
guage with a long quotation of “the moving words of Mr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. 
Alabama.”  Id. 
97 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966). 
98 Id. at 480-81. 
99 For example, the Court overturned lower court decisions offering lawyers special 
protections from facially neutral statutes in a pair of 2010 cases.  See Jerman v. Carlisle, 
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1622 (2010) (holding that a 
debt-collecting lawyer’s duty to comply with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act over-
rides the ethical duty to advance his client’s interests); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. 
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1331-33 (2010) (rejecting the argument that the federal 
prohibition on debt-relief agencies advising clients to incur more debt before filing for 
bankruptcy does not apply to law firms).  Similarly, in Montejo v. Louisiana, the Court 
held that police officers could contact criminal defendants after the appointment of 
counsel.  129 S. Ct. 2079, 2087 (2009).  In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected ar-
guments based upon the sanctity of the lawyer-client relationship and the existence of 
an ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct barring contact with represented parties.  
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away from blind faith in lawyers as indispensable for fair trials is a sig-
nificant part of this landmark development. 
B.  More Sustainable Pro Se Court Reform 
All over the country, state and local courts are deluged by pro se 
litigants.100  The crush of pro se litigation has been one of civil Gideon 
proponents’ main arguments.  Yet the Court and academics have 
largely ignored this phenomenon.  Outside of the civil Gideon debate, 
however, lower courts have begun a quiet procedural revolution.  All 
over the country, judges, court administrators, legal aid lawyers, and 
advocates for the poor have been working together on pro se court 
reform.  These reforms aim to make court processes simpler, fairer, 
and more user-friendly. 
Examples of organized pro se court reform abound.  In 2005, the 
American Judicature Society (AJS) published a guide for judges inter-
ested in making their courts more pro se friendly.101  The Self-
Represented Litigation Network has also published a set of core mate-
rials gathering national best practices.102  The National Center for State 
Courts has published The Self-Help Friendly Court:  Designed from the 
Ground Up to Work for People Without Lawyers.103  And various research 
 
Id.  As the Court put it, “[T]he Constitution does not codify the ABA’s Model Rules, 
and does not make investigating police officers lawyers.”  Id. 
100 See Gillian Hadfield, A Case for Legal Aid at Wal-Mart, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 
2010, at A17. 
101 See CYNTHIA GRAY, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y & STATE JUSTICE INST., REACHING OUT 
OR OVERREACHING:  JUDICIAL ETHICS AND SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS (2005).  The 
report presents a list of commonsense steps that judges may take to help pro se liti-
gants, and contains a section on “Proposed Best Practices.”  Id. at 51-57.  These include 
making procedural accommodations, being courteous, avoiding legal jargon and pro-
cedural snafus, explaining the process, avoiding over-familiarity with lawyers in the 
courtroom, and training court staff to provide patient and helpful service to self-
represented litigants.  Id. 
102 See THE SELF-REPRESENTED LITIG. NETWORK, CORE MATERIALS ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGATION INNOVATION (2006) (listing articles and websites that provide 
information and research on pro se litigation). 
103 RICHARD ZORZA, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE SELF-HELP FRIENDLY COURT:  
DESIGNED FROM THE GROUND UP TO WORK FOR PEOPLE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2002), avail-
able at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_ProSe_SelfHelpCtPub.pdf.  
The Preface, written by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, chronicles 
California’s recent efforts to improve pro se court access, including a nine-hundred-
page self-help guide on its website for pro se litigants that is visited over 100,000 times 
per month.  Id. at 7-8.  AJS even has an online forum dedicated to pro se issues.  Pro Se 
Forum, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, http://www.ajs.org/prose/home.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 
2012); see also Richard Zorza, Self-Represented Litigants and the Access to Justice Revolution in 
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projects have observed and proposed a number of innovative court 
processes to improve access for pro se litigants.104 
The national adoption of court-appointed special advocate 
(CASA) programs for custody matters serves as a model of innovation 
in promoting access to justice.105  These nonlawyer advocates assist 
courts and pro se litigants for a fraction of the cost of retaining an at-
torney.  Turner endorsed these programs by mentioning the possibility 
of having social workers assist in child support disputes.106 
Forward-thinking lower courts have established innovative pro-
grams as well.  For example, the Eastern District of New York has cre-
ated a special magistrate court for pro se matters, and San Antonio has 
established a pro se assistance program in its civil courts.107   
The reports, studies, and programs listed above describe only gov-
ernment-supported pro se efforts.  But there are also many for-profit 
pro se assistance websites like legalzoom.com and rocketlawyer.com.  
If one considers both private and public options, opportunities for 
innovative, inexpensive, and effective pro se representation are im-
proving exponentially.   
Properly understood, Turner recognizes and protects pro se liti-
gants.  It offers courts and poverty advocates a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity:  the chance to move beyond 1963 solutions to 2012 court 
problems.  Not every court dispute requires a lawyer’s involvement, 
and neither litigants nor society can afford lawyers for each dispute.  
 
the State Courts:  Cross-Pollinating Perspectives Toward a Dialogue for Innovation in the Courts 
and the Administrative Law System, 29 J. NAT’L ASSOC. ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 63, 68-74 
(2009) (describing various courts’ efforts to expand access to justice including self-help 
centers, simplifying forms, improving technological availability, staff training, and oth-
ers). 
104 See, e.g., Ronald W. Staudt & Paula L. Hannaford, Access to Justice for the Self-
Represented Litigant:  An Interdisciplinary Investigation by Designers and Lawyers, 52 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 1017, 1029-41 (2002) (listing primarily technical solutions proposed by 
design and law students after observing problems in self-represented litigation). 
105 See, e.g., About Us, CASA FOR CHILDREN, http://www.casaforchildren.org/site/ 
c.mtJSJ7MPIsE/b.5301303/k.6FB1/About_Us__CASA_for_Children.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2012) (describing a program of citizen advocates who help place abused chil-
dren in new homes). 
106 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2011). 
107 See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se 
Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475, 493-97 (2002) (detailing the 
New York program); see also Anita Davis, A Pro Se Program That Is Also “Pro” Judges, Law-
yers, and the Public, 63 TEX. B.J. 896, 896 (2000) (describing how Bexar County civil 
courts employ a staff attorney to assist courts and pro se litigants in preparing dockets, 
coordinating mediation and litigation, and answering general questions). 
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Rather than looking backward to Gideon, Turner invites forward-
looking, flexible pro se alternatives. 
The danger is that Turner’s minimal suggestions will ossify.  Turner 
itself suggests rather limited safeguards:  notice, a form, an opportuni-
ty to respond at a hearing, and a clear finding.108  But the Court quite 
explicitly stated that these are not “the only possible alternatives” and 
that other forms of pro se assistance (like a neutral social worker) may 
also be helpful.109  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s suggestions in 
practice often become not only a constitutional floor, but also a ceil-
ing.110  Instead of falling into this pitfall and abandoning experimenta-
tion, lower courts should use Turner as a spur to further innovation.   
Judges and court clerks cannot address pro se–heavy dockets by 
trying to recreate the traditional adversarial system without lawyers.  
Instead, all court personnel must adopt a more managerial posture.  
Courts in civil-law nations may be apt models for study and imitation.111  
Courts should also carefully examine the sufficiency of existing pro se 
practices.  For example, sometimes hearings do not even include ex-
plicit findings of fact.112  
 
108 Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2519.  Ossification would be especially unfortunate because 
the Court, reaching the issue sua sponte, did not have the benefit of research or brief-
ing on the various procedures with which states are experimenting to facilitate pro se 
access to civil justice.   
109 Id. 
110 For example, Miranda warnings were supposed to be only one way of preventing 
compelled self-incrimination, but the Court’s imprimatur has made them universal.  See 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring the now-famous Miranda warn-
ings “unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their 
right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it”); Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000) (concluding that “Miranda announced a 
constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively” partially because “Mi-
randa has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warn-
ings have become part of our national culture”).  
111 See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PODOMO, THE CIVIL 
LAW TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN 
AMERICA 34-38 (3d ed. 2007) (contrasting the role of the judge in common law and 
civil law courts). 
112 In Turner, for example, while the child support court found Turner in con-
tempt, the judge did not indicate on the preprinted contempt-of-court form whether 
“he was or was not gainfully employed, nor whether he had the ability to make these 
support payments when due.”  131 S. Ct. at 2514.  Findings of fact are important to 
permit meaningful appellate review of the lower court’s holding and reasoning.  In 
Turner, civil contempt required a showing of a willful refusal to pay, but there was no 
explicit finding on that issue.  Id. at 2513. 
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Though the Court has finally recognized the need for alternative 
procedures, legislatures, academics, court administrators, public inter-
est groups, and others must continue to innovate to promote pro se 
access to justice. 
C.  The Implicit Role of Resource Constraints 
We live in a world of scarcity.  In the past, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly acknowledged funding constraints as a reason not to ex-
pand the right to counsel:  lawyers and complex procedures cost time 
and money, meaning that the needy have less overall funding.113  As 
Judge Friendly put it, “[A]t some point the benefit to individuals from 
an additional safeguard is substantially outweighed by the cost of 
providing such protection, and . . . the expense of protecting those 
likely to be found undeserving will probably come out of the pockets 
of the deserving.”114 
Based on this scarcity, Congress has specifically declined to fund 
appointed counsel in child support–related civil contempt cases such 
as Turner.115  Likewise, some states have reserved appointed counsel for 
criminal and unusually complex civil cases.  State courts usually retain 
discretion to appoint counsel in civil actions that are too complex for 
pro se litigants to defend themselves.116  The Supreme Court has 
avoided treading on these legislative and judicial judgments. 
Civil Gideon advocates tend to focus on one type of case in isola-
tion.  But in a world of tight budgets, criminal and civil defense com-
pete for funding.  Tradeoffs are inevitable, and the need for appointed 
 
113 See, e.g., Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 326 (1985) 
(giving “great weight” to the government’s interest in avoiding increased administrative 
costs for veterans’ hearings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 (1973) (citing the 
“financial cost to the State” of requiring appointed counsel). 
114 Friendly, supra note 80, at 1276, quoted with approval in Walters, 473 U.S. at 321 n.9. 
115 See S. REP. NO. 98-387, at 23 (1984) (explaining that Congress does not intend to 
provide federal matching for expenditures in child support–enforcement programs for 
providing defense counsel to indigent parents); see also 45 C.F.R. § 304.23(i)–(j) (2010) 
(barring expenditure of federal funds for indigent defense counsel or costs relating to 
jailing parents in child support enforcement); Child Support Enforcement Program; 
Prohibition of Federal Funding of Costs of Incarceration and Counsel for Indigent 
Absent Parents, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,130, 32,130 (Aug. 26, 1987) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
304) (including certain expenses—such as providing defense counsel to indigent par-
ents—in list of expenditures for which federal funds are not available). 
116 See, e.g., S.C. APP. CT. R. 608(g)(1) (granting state judges discretion in appointing 
counsel but cautioning that “[t]he unnecessary appointment of lawyers . . . places an un-
due burden on the lawyers of this State”); Ex parte Foster, 565 S.E.2d 290, 293 (S.C. 2002) 
(remanding for a determination of whether the action was “so complex” that failing to 
appoint a lawyer would “unfairly hamper [respondent’s] ability to defend his case”). 
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counsel is far greater in felony cases, especially capital cases.  Felony 
cases, unlike civil cases, carry a Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury 
and so entail jury instructions, arguments, and related complexities.  
Felony cases also involve elaborate criminal procedures, ranging from 
formal rules of evidence to constitutional disclosure requirements.  
Felony cases pit individual defendants against experienced, profes-
sional police and prosecutors wielding the power of the state.117  Felony 
convictions often carry collateral consequences, including criminal 
records and disqualification from jobs, and they also impose criminal 
stigma.  And, of course, felony convictions can result in long prison 
sentences or even the death penalty. 
Some exceptional civil cases may merit counsel, either because 
they are particularly complex or because they are otherwise especially 
important or meritorious.  But these determinations demand case-by-
case judgments, not blanket constitutional rules.  Legal aid societies 
and trial courts already triage their caseloads, selecting a fraction of 
civil cases as most deserving and most in need of limited resources.  
Constitutional rules would fetter this contextual exercise of discretion 
with mandatory, rigid requirements. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that lawyers make much of a dif-
ference in simple cases.  Most studies of lawyers in civil litigation have 
been observational case studies flawed by nonrandom assignment of 
lawyers to possibly more meritorious cases.118  Two Harvard researchers 
reviewed the existing literature and found “astonishingly little credi-
ble, quantitative information about the effect of representation.”119  
The only two studies that were methodologically sound reached con-
flicting results; in the one study that found that lawyers affected out-
comes, those effects disappeared in informal proceedings.120  The 
Harvard researchers have conducted their own randomized, con-
 
117 Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2520 (2011) (“[T]he average defendant 
does not have the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a 
tribunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experi-
enced and learned counsel.” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938) (em-
phasis added by the Court in Turner)). 
118 See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in 
Legal Assistance:  What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 56), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1708664 (describing previous studies as “unworthy of credence” and observing 
that “the only way to produce credible quantitative results . . . is with randomized trials”). 
119 Id. at 69.  
120 Id. at 68-69. 
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trolled study of administrative unemployment hearings.121  They found 
no significant difference in success rates between defendants who were 
offered free legal representation and those who were not.122  In fact, 
the only major difference was that introducing lawyers delayed case 
resolution.123  Based on these findings, there seems to be little benefit 
to providing lawyers across the board, especially in simple cases. 
Another empirical study has reached the same conclusion about 
routinely appointing counsel in misdemeanor cases.  Erica Hashimoto 
found that federal pro se misdemeanor defendants average lower rates 
of conviction and lower sentences in all categories of cases except for 
driving under the influence.124  Hashimoto’s research indicates that 
lawyers appear to add less value in simple misdemeanor cases than in 
more complex and serious cases.125  Because procedures are simpler 
and the stakes are lower, lawyers simply have much less to do.  A sensi-
ble triage policy would take that simplicity into account.   
Finally, funding realities mean that states cannot and do not pro-
vide civil counsel across the board even where required by law.  In 
2006, the Supreme Court of New Jersey ordered the State to appoint 
counsel before confining nonsupporting parents for civil contempt.126   
In the wake of that ruling, however, New Jersey was not able to fund 
such counsel.127  Thus, until Turner, child support officials had to release 
nonsupporting parents who qualified for appointed counsel, instead 
of enforcing child support through civil contempt.128 
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts presume that poor defendants are en-
titled to appointed counsel whenever they face loss of physical liberty.129  
Despite this presumption, Pennsylvania counties have repeatedly failed 
 
121 Id. at 12.   
122 Id. at 26.   
123 Id. at 44-45.   
124 Hashimoto, supra note 44, at 490-93 & tbls.2-6. 
125 Id. at 496. 
126 See Pasqua v. Council, 892 A.2d 663, 674 (N.J. 2006) (grounding this right in the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause), abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (2011). 
127 See Brief of Senators DeMint et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
app. 8a, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10) (reporting data collected by the Office of 
Child Support Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
from states’ child support–enforcement authorities, including New Jersey’s). 
128 See id. (noting that, because it has no funding, New Jersey had to release all non-
supporting parents found to be indigent if they are held in contempt). 
129 See Commonwealth v. $9,847.00 U.S. Currency, 704 A.2d 612, 615-17 (Pa. 1997) 
(acknowledging “a presumption” that “an indigent litigant has a right to appointed coun-
sel . . . when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty” (quoting Lassiter v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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to appoint counsel for indigent parents facing civil contempt.130  The 
civil Gideon right collided with funding realities. 
Even where lawyers are appointed in child support cases, they are 
often too overburdened to provide much help.  They have neither the 
time nor resources to investigate the circumstances of the case or pro-
vide meaningful counsel to their clients.  Often, they can do little 
more than parrot to the judge what their clients have told them.  “In 
many of the [child support] courtrooms we watched, these attorneys 
would call out their client’s name as the court room filled with cases, 
meeting the client for the first time just prior to the hearing.”131  When 
lawyers juggle many cases and learn little about each one, they can add 
little value for their clients or for the justice system overall.132   
Yet the public interest bar has been slow to recognize these reali-
ties.  The American Bar Association, the National Association of Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers, and the Constitution Project have all protested 
the limited funding of criminal defense counsel.133  The Center for 
Family Policy and Practice has noted that lawyer-for-a-day programs 
provide very few benefits.134  Yet all of these organizations also filed 
amicus briefs in Turner in support of a broad civil Gideon right.135   
Setting aside the American Bar Association’s self-interest in secur-
ing more funding for its members, the problem represents a refusal to 
accept reality.  The organizations hope for a new judicial ruling guar-
anteeing the right to counsel in civil cases, but at the same time decry 
how underfunding subverts existing rights to counsel in practice.  New 
rulings recognizing expanded rights will not increase the amount of 
available funding; instead, they will compete with other rights to coun-
 
130 See, e.g., Application for Extraordinary Relief Under Pa. R.A.P. § 3309 and King’s 
Bench Powers at 10, Cepeda v. Court of Common Pleas, No. 128 MM 2009, slip op. (Pa. 
June 24, 2010) (claiming that eight indigent petitioners were imprisoned for contempt 
after allegedly failing to pay child support, without being represented by counsel or in-
formed they had a right to counsel); Brief Amici Curiae of the National Ass’n of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers et al., supra note 76, at 28-29 (maintaining that “indigent parents facing 
contempt charges in Pennsylvania are not being provided with counsel”). 
131 REBECCA MAY & MARGUERITE ROULET, CTR. FOR FAMILY POLICY & PRACTICE, A 
LOOK AT ARRESTS OF LOW-INCOME FATHERS FOR CHILD SUPPORT NONPAYMENT:  EN-
FORCEMENT, COURT AND PROGRAM PRACTICES 45 (2005), available at http://www.cpr-
mn.org/Documents/noncompliance.pdf. 
132 See id. (noting that adding lawyers with high case turnover will do little to “per-
suade a judge to be lenient, even when the facts of the case might merit leniency”). 
133 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text. 
135 See supra note 76. 
Barton&BibasFINAL.docx (DO NOT DELETE)  2/22/2012 12:00 PM 
994 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 967 
sel, spreading funding ever thinner.  The result may be a Pyrrhic victory:  
lawyer-for-a-day programs that provide counsel in name only.   
CONCLUSION 
Turner arrives at a particularly interesting time for the judiciary 
and the legal profession.  While technology has transformed most oth-
er areas of life, court-based dispute resolution has remained remarka-
bly impervious to change.  Courts across the country must adapt an 
adversary system designed to be navigated by expert counsel to the 
realities of mass pro se representation. 
If pro se reform is to go beyond the bare minimum, stakeholders 
must work together.  Judges, court administrators, and clerks must ac-
celerate their efforts to accommodate the pro se flood.  Judges need to 
recognize that, in many pro se cases, a more aggressive and inquisito-
rial approach is appropriate.  Court clerks must cease refusing to an-
swer questions or assist pro se litigants for fear of the unauthorized 
practice of law.  
Bar associations and judges will likewise need to rethink strict en-
forcement of unauthorized-practice-of-law rules.  Throughout the 
economy, routine and mechanical tasks are being outsourced or han-
dled by computers.  Lawyers can try in vain to stem that tide by prose-
cuting unauthorized practice of law, or they can abandon cookie-
cutter cases and focus on those that need individualized legal judg-
ment.  Where the law is simple and disputes are factual, paralegals, 
investigators, and social workers can help to investigate facts, marshal 
evidence, and prepare clients to tell their own stories. 
The real danger to the legal profession has always been that pro se 
court reform will spread upwards from the poor to the middle class 
and beyond.  Certainly, paid divorce lawyers have little incentive to 
support straightforward, cheap, and fast pro se divorces for the poor.  
What is bad for lawyers, however, may be good for citizens and the 
economy as a whole by reducing the deadweight burden of legal fees. 
Technology may make these disputes moot sooner rather than later.  
In the meantime, the Court in Turner was right to recognize that more 
lawyers do not always equal more justice and that fair pro se proce-
dures are better for everyone.  Other actors must now translate pro se 
court reform from Turner’s sketch into a viable pro se system. 
